This episode, garnering a PG-13 rating from Roberts, was a fascinating look inside the formal and informal governance structures of America’s prisons with guest David Skarbek.

As always, we’d like to continue learning. Have a look at the prompts below and thanks for listening.

1. What constitutes “formal governance” in prisons, according to Skarbek, and why does he argue that such governance is largely insufficient in prisons today? How do Skarbek’s definitions of “formal” and “informal” governance compare to institutional structures in the outside world? What analogies can you draw between prison order and civil society?

2. Skarbek argues that the written constitutions which exist for some prison gangs are not as effective as they might like. What makes them ineffective? Other outlaw groups, by comparison, have had success with written constitutions. (Revisit this episode with Peter Lesson on social order among pirates for more.) Why are such formalized rules more successful in one “outlaw” (prison) setting than another (pirates)? What lessons can we draw from these experiences for non-outlaw social groups?

How are prison gangs like primitive states? 3. How are prison gangs like primitive states? (For more on Mancur Olsen’s distinction between roving and stationary bandits, see this EconLog post by David Henderson.) What does this suggest for those trying to curb the negative behaviors of prison gangs?